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“Neither a borrower nor a lender be”   




This paper examines the relationship between the insolvency systems and the investment share of 
GDP across countries. The objective is to find out the relationship between bankruptcy procedures 
and economic performances around the world. 
Empirical evidence suggests that: 1) the investment share of GDP is higher in those countries 
characterized by highly efficient bankruptcy system; the more efficient the insolvency procedures in 
terms of time, cost and recovery rate, the more readily available debt is and the higher the 
Investment/GDP ratio is; 2) the investment share of gross domestic product is positively associated 
with the degree of sophistication of the Bankruptcy Law, at least below a certain level of legal 
production; 3) data suggest some complementary effect between Bankruptcy Law and Enforcement 
for rich countries, while the interaction term indicates some substitution effect when poor countries 
are considered. Some policy implications conclude the work. 
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Many economists stress the importance of the institutions and the legal system for understanding 
economic development. Several studies focus attention on the link between the evolution of legal 
and financial systems and economic development (La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et al. 1997; Levine 
1998; Rajan and Zingales 1998; King and Levine 1993) but they “… do not control for cross-
country differences in bankruptcy procedures” (Levine 1998, pag. 600). Other researches 
investigate bankruptcy procedures around the world (Djankov et al. 2007; Claessens and Klapper 
2005) but they do not explicitly study the connection between bankruptcy environment and 
economic performance. The objective of the paper is to fill this gap in the literature. 
Given the current international financial crisis, caused by the subprime mortgage crisis, many 
households and firms are likely to go under
1. Also the mortgage financing companies and banks, 
                                                 
1 US household debt as percentage of income rose to 130% during 2007, versus 100% earlier in the decade. Americans 
spent $800 billion per year more than they earned. Household debt grew from $680 billion in 1974 to $14 trillion in 
2008, with the total doubling since 2001(Newsweek.com, retrevied on 24 Oct 2008).    2
which usually play the role of guaranteed creditors in a standard insolvency procedure, are likely to 
go under without the state aid. The declared bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the 4
th US investment 
bank and one of the biggest US financial institution, is a well known case. 
Now it is a perfect time to reconsider an old question“…how to handle such failures: let them sink, 
or give them a chance to swim?” (The Economist 2002). America's bankruptcy code, in particular 
its Chapter 11 protection for firms from their creditors, is particularly friendly to troubled 
borrowers, allowing them to borrow more money and giving them time to work out their problems. 
Some other countries quickly close down a bankrupt firm, and try to repay its debts by selling off 
any assets it has. 
This research adds to the ongoing discussion on bankruptcy systems and their efficiency. Two 
clarifications, however, are required. First, even if the household over-indebtedness and consumer 
bankruptcy is a relevant field of discussion given the current financial crisis, the paper focuses on 
firms’ bankruptcy. European Commission has only recently suggested a common definition of 
personal over-indebtedness
2 (European Commission 2008). Moreover, few countries around the 
world explicitly regulate personal bankruptcy, while firms’ bankruptcy law is available in the 
majority of countries, although with different degrees of sophistication. Second, the research 
considers ex-post regulation efficiency (how to solve insolvency) and not ex-ante regulation (how 
to avoid insolvency). 
The aim of the paper is to examine whether and to what extent cross-country differences in the 
Bankruptcy law and its efficiency explain cross-country differences in the level of investment share 
of GDP. Answering this question has important policy implications, given the current legislative 
and regulatory responses to lending practices and bankruptcy protection. Both the bankruptcy law 
and its enforcement may influence ex-ante risk-taking incentives and total amount of investment. 
Bankruptcy regulation, however, is not an easy task because of significant counterbalancing factors. 
On the one side, good bankruptcy laws make it easier for firms to get credit and invest because they 
strengthen creditors’ power and reassure them that they will not lose their money if the debtor 
becomes insolvent. On the other side, if bankrupts are punished too severely, would-be 
entrepreneurs may be discouraged from taking the financial risks needed to make the most of their 
ideas. As it is known, how bankrupts are treated may significantly affect economic growth: “… the 
availability of debt, and the willingness to take it on, is a crucial ingredient of economic growth, 
because it allow individuals, firms and governments to make investments they would not otherwise 
be able to afford” (www.economist.com/research/Economics, retrieved on 22 Oct 2007). 
The paper finds that both the degree of sophistication of the Bankruptcy Law and the efficiency of 
the insolvency proceedings are positively associated with the investment share of  gross domestic 
product. In rich countries, however, the investment share of GDP would be influenced by the 
expected enforcement of bankruptcy procedures more than the degree of sophistication of the 
Bankruptcy Law. Legal production is sufficiently high and overlapping laws have often decelerated 
the civil justice and increased the costs of the insolvency proceedings. When poor countries’ 
investments are considered, bankruptcy law enters significantly with the expected positive sign. The 
result could be partially explained by the fact that poor countries usually have very simple debt 
enforcement proceedings. When bankrupts are expected to be punished too quickly and severely, 
entrepreneurs may be discouraged from taking the financial risks needed to make their investments, 
as well as letting off defaulting debtors too readily may discourage potential creditors because of 
moral hazard.  Therefore, a certain degree of sophistication of the Bankruptcy Law is desirable at 
the least to guarantee creditors and make investments possible. 
                                                 
2 “over-indebtedness means, but is not limited to, the situation where the debt burden of an individual or a family 
manifestly and/or on a long-term basis exceeds the payment capacity” (Group of Specialists for Legal Solutions to Debt 
Problems, Cj-SDebt). 
   3
Furthermore, the estimation results would suggest some complementary effect between the degree 
of sophistication of the Bankruptcy Law and the efficiency of the insolvency procedures in rich 
countries, while the interaction term indicates some substitution effect in poor countries, suggesting 
that countries characterized by weak bankruptcy law have answered by rigorously enforcing 
insolvency procedures. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a brief literature review. Section 2 
summarizes the main insolvency procedures and the recent bankruptcy reforms around the world. 
Section 3 describes the methodology and the data. Section 4 presents empirical evidence. Some 
concluding remarks follow. 
 
1.  Literature Review 
 
Several theoretical and empirical studies on the effects of insolvency procedures and their 
efficiency have emerged in recent law and economics literature. 
Theoretical studies concern the financial structure of firms and incomplete debt contracts (Tirole 
2006; Hart et al. 1997; Zwiebel 1996; Hart 1995; Aghion and Bolton 1992; Bolton and Scharfstein 
1990; Hart and Moore 1989). Hart (1995) develops a theoretical model of debt finance that allows 
to identify necessary conditions for projects finance. Tirole (2006) emphasizes the governance 
function of debt as control mechanism for managers’ opportunism. The extreme case of bankruptcy 
could determine a loss of reputation for managers, frequently followed by a stigma and social 
disapproval. Moreover, the decision to keep liquidity outside the firm can be read as a strategy to 
prevent managers from wasting financial resources in investments which are not profitable for the 
firm. Hart et al. (1997) describe a new efficient insolvency procedure based on two types of 
auctions, an internal auction and a public auction, which allows low discretion to courts, managers, 
creditors and shareholders. Moreover, this insolvency procedure can be adopted also in those 
countries where the financial markets do not work well, such as developing countries transition 
economies. 
The case of multiple investors is explicitly considered by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Berglof 
and von Thadden (1994). 
The empirical literature includes two types of studies. In the first group, bankruptcy is analysed at a 
firm-level in specific settings within a specific country (Couwenberg and de Jong 2008; Bris et al. 
2006; Armour et al. 2006; Baird et al. 2005; Davidenko and Franks 2005; Franks and Sussman 
2005; Lopucki and Doherty 2004; Citron et al. 2003; Ferris and Lawless 2000; Lubben 2000; 
Thorburn 2000; Ravid and Sundgren 1998; Sundgren 1998; Betker 1997; Tashijan et al. 1996; 
Franks et al. 1996; Betker 1995; Franks and Torous 1994; Weiss 1990). 
In the second group of empirical studies, the legal system is analysed across countries. Legal 
variables are related to other country characteristics in order to measure the macro-economic 
implications of legal systems.  
One fundamental research is that of La Porta et al. (1998) that examines legal rules covering 
protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, the quality of their 
enforcement and ownership concentration in 49 countries. The results show that laws, as well as 
law enforcement, differ markedly around the world depending on the legal origin of a country
3. 
They also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is 
negatively related to investor protection, consistently with the hypothesis that small, diversified 
shareholders are unlike to be important in countries that fail to protect these rights.  
                                                 
3 In particular, countries whose legal rules originate in the common-law tradition tend to protect investors considerably 
more than the countries whose laws originate in the civil-law (especially the French-civil-law) tradition. Also law 
enforcement differs a great deal around the world. German-civil-law and Scandinavian countries have the best quality 
of law enforcement, while law enforcement is strong in common-law countries (La Porta et al. 1998).   4
Other studies analyse the link between finance and growth
4. La Porta et al. (1997) show that 
countries with poor investor protections have significantly smaller debt and equity market. King and 
Levine (1993), Levine (1998) and Levine and Zervos (1998) find that financial development 
promotes economic growth. Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that countries with better developed 
financial systems show superior growth in capital-intensive sectors that rely particularly heavily on 
external finance.  
All these studies describe a link from the legal system, more specifically creditors’ rights, to 
economic development. Recent financial crises have highlighted the importance of insolvency 
systems to resolve corporate sector financial distress. Creditor rights would affect not only the 
efficiency of ex-post resolution of distressed corporation, but also the ex-ante risk-taking incentives 
and an economy’s degree of entrepreneurship more generally. Claessens and Klapper (2005) 
document how often bankruptcy is used for a panel of 35 countries. They find that bankruptcies are 
higher in Anglo-Saxon countries and in market-oriented financial systems more than bank-oriented 
economies. Moreover, greater judicial efficiency is associated with more use of bankruptcy, but the 
combination of stronger creditor rights with greater judicial efficiency leads to less use. Djankov et 
al. (2007) focus attention on debt enforcement around the world. They construct a measure of the 
efficiency of debt enforcement in each country and find that it is strongly correlated with per capita 
income, legal origin and with measures of the quality of contract enforcement and public regulation 
obtained in other studies. Looking at worldwide averages, all procedures are extremely time 
consuming, costly and inefficient, but there is some evidence that richer countries have a 
comparative advantage at more complex procedures. In the rich countries, the most efficient 
procedure is reorganization, in the lower middle income countries the best procedure is foreclosure 
since the attempts to rehabilitate the firm nearly always fail. Recent empirical evidence would 
suggest that different debt enforcement institutions might be appropriate for countries at different 
income levels (Ayotte and Yun 2007; Gennaioli and Rossi 2006; Djankov et al. 2003). For this 
reason, even if data show that the insolvency law and efficiency of the bankruptcy proceedings vary 
significantly also across rich countries (think about the Italian civil justice inefficiency), most of the 
following analysis distinguishes between rich and poor countries. 
This research contributes to the second group of empirical studies by giving some evidence on 
bankruptcy systems and economic performances across 91 countries over the 1992-2006 period. 
 
2.  Bankruptcy procedures around the world  
 
Insolvency procedures and judicial efficiency vary significantly across countries. Some countries 
have complex insolvency systems while others have simple liquidation procedure. However, the 
usual distinction concerns  pro-debtor and pro-creditor systems. 
The US Bankruptcy Code represents the pro-debtor system above all others. In America, 
bankruptcy has come to mean a second chance for bust businesses. The famous “Chapter 11” law, 
the reorganization provision in the US Bankruptcy Code, aims at giving a company time to get back 
on its feet, by shielding it from debt payments and prodding banks to negotiate with their debtor. It 
even allows an insolvent company to receive fresh finance after it goes bust. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, when companies stumbled, almost as much effort was spent in 
fingering the guilty as in trying to salvage a viable business. British, Italian and French laws, for 
example, established criminal penalties and personal liability for a failing company's manager. 
Moreover, bankers had the power, at the first sign of trouble, to push a company into the arms of the 
receivers. Some reforms have been adopted in recent years, however.  
                                                 
4 For a critical survey see Trew (2006).   5
Several European countries, on the basis of Chapter 11 US Bankruptcy Code, changed their 
bankruptcy law due to a lack of the reorganization power of their systems. The liquidation-based 
origins of these European laws were considered out of date and were deemed to lead to over-
liquidation (Couwenberg and de Jong 2008). Belgium changed its rules in 1998, France in 1994, 
Finland in 1993, Germany in 1994 (Couwenberg 2001), the UK in 2002, Italy in 2005/2006. 
Other European and Non-European countries adopted to various degrees bankruptcy reforms 
(table1). A new bankruptcy law drafted in 2004 in Czech Republic may drastically improve the 
efficiency of financial distress resolution. Brazil introduced a reorganization procedure in 2004 that 
helps viable enterprises stay alive and gives secured creditors more influence over the process. 
Serbia also introduced reforms in 2004, setting strict time limits and strengthening accountability 
standards for bankruptcy administrators. In 2005/06 fourteen countries
5 adopted bankruptcy reforms 
(forty since 2003); among these, only Peru and Uzbekistan adopted negative reform. Burundi and 
Micronesia both enacted their first bankruptcy law. France, Italy, Korea and Slovakia adopted 
reforms that allow preinsolvency  proceedings and make reorganization more attractive; Chile, 
Latvia, Serbia and Slovakia adopted reforms that improve supervision of administrators. Also 
Puerto Rico and United States shortened time limits for bankruptcy procedures (World Bank, Doing 
Business Report 2007) 
Five countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Georgia, Armenia, Hungary, Croatia, 
Uzbekistan) joined China as top reformers in bankruptcy in 2006/07 (table 1). Also Italy, Denmark 
and Portugal improved their bankruptcy systems in 2007 (World Bank, Doing Business Report 
2008). 
 
Table 1 Bankruptcy Reforms, 2005-2007 
Positive Reforms  Countries 
Introduced first bankruptcy law  Burundi, Micronesia 
Allowed preinsolvency proceedings and made 
reorganization more attractive 
France, Italy, Korea, Slovakia 
Strengthened creditors’ powers and improved 
supervision of administrators 
France, Korea, Romania, Slovakia 
Granted priority to secured creditors  China, Hungary, Uzbekistan 
Introduced or shortened time limits on bankruptcy 
procedures 
Armenia, Georgia, Puerto Rico, 
Slovakia, United States 
Established reorganization procedure  China, Georgia 
Set up one-stop shop for voluntary liquidation  Portugal, Uzbekistan 
Introduced professional requirements for trustees  Croatia, Georgia 
Strengthened trustees’ role  Denmark, Italy 
Allowed sale at private auction  Mauritius 
Negative Reforms  Countries 
No longer possible to amend a reorganization plan 
once it has been approved 
Peru, Uzbekistan 
Amended its Insolvency Act to give wage claims 
preference over the claims of secured creditors 
Botswana 
 
Stripped bankruptcy judges of jurisdiction over labor 
lawsuits and exempted such claims from the 
automatic stay applicable to claims 
Argentina 
   Source: Doing Business database 
 
                                                 
5 The countries are Burundi, Chile, France, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Micronesia, Peru, Puerto Rico, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia, United States, Uzbekistan (World Bank Doing Business Report 2007).   6
Apart from specific differences in bankruptcy provisions across countries, the legal procedures for 
resolving a firm’s insolvency can generally lead to two different outcomes: the firm continuing 
operation as a going concern or to its piecemeal sale (Djankov et al. 2007; Couwenberg 2001). 
Three types of procedure are essentially adopted around the world to obtain such outcomes. 
Foreclosure is a relatively simple debt enforcement procedure aimed at recovering money owed to 
secured creditors. Foreclosure does not protect unsecured creditors, who must rely on separate 
insolvency proceedings to recover the amounts owed them
6.  
Liquidation is the procedure of winding up a company under court supervision. Firms can either sell 
their assets piecemeal or, via a going concern asset sale, sell assets as a complex in which the asset 
specific synergies may be retained. 
Reorganization is a court-supervised procedure aimed at rehabilitating companies in financial 
distress. Firms are given the opportunity to renegotiate with creditors in order to adjust their 
liabilities. This procedure protects the company while it attempts to rehabilitate itself; in fact, once 
reorganization begins, creditors generally may not enforce their claims against the company. If the 
process yields an acceptable agreement, then a court has the power to confirm that plan that can be 
forced upon dissenting creditors; those firms that fail to get an accepted plan are in most instances  
transferred to the liquidation procedure. If the reorganization plans are not successful, the firms re-
enter the bankruptcy procedure
7. The current management of the insolvent firm may or may not 
retain control of the company during reorganization.  
In the following analysis, the described insolvency procedures are used to measure the degree of 
sophistication of the Bankruptcy Law adopted in each country. 
 
3.  Methodology and data 
 
The empirical analysis investigates the legal determinants of investment share of GDP focusing 
attention, in particular, to bankruptcy proceedings across 91 countries over the 1992-2006 period
8. 
The goal of the research is to verify whether, and to what extent, differences in the Bankruptcy law 
and efficiency explain differences in investment percentage of GDP. The regression takes the form: 
it i t it it it it it it it
it
u RISK FIN SAV INT RULE ENF BANKR
GDP
INV
ε γ β β β β β β β β + + + + + + + + + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0        (1)  
t=1992, …, 2006   i=1, …, 91 countries 
                                                 
6 Note that in some countries foreclosure is governed by laws separate from bankruptcy law (Djankov et al. 2006).  
Furthermore, within the United States and many other countries, several types of foreclosure exist. Foreclosure by 
judicial sale, more commonly known as judicial foreclosure, involves the sale of the mortgaged property, subject to 
auction, under the supervision of a court. Foreclosure by power of sale, commonly referred to as statutory or non-
judicial foreclosure, involves the sale of the property by the mortgage holder without court supervision. With this type 
of foreclosure, if the debtor fails to cure the default, or use other lawful means (such as filing for bankruptcy which 
provides a temporary automatic stay to the foreclosure proceeding) to stop the sale, the mortgagee or its representative 
will conduct a public auction. The highest bidder at the auction becomes the owner of the immovable property free and 
clear of any interest of the former owner but the property may be encumbered by any liens superior to the mortgage 
being foreclosed (e.g. a senior mortgage, unpaid property taxes etc). Other types of foreclosure are considered minor 
because of their limited availability. Under strict foreclosure, the noteholder claims the title and possession of the 
property back in full satisfaction of a debt, usually on contract. More specifically, suit is brought by the mortgagee and, 
if successful, a court orders the defaulted mortgagor to pay the mortgage within a specified period of time. Should the 
mortgagor fail to do so, the mortgage holder gains the title to the property with no obligation to sell it. This type of 
foreclosure is generally available only when the value of the property is less than the debt ("under water"). Historically, 
strict foreclosure was the original method of foreclosure. The analysis of the different types of foreclosure, however, is 
out of the scope of this study. 
7 For an overview of survival routes in Sweden, France, Germany, United Kingdom and United States see Couwenberg 
(2001). 
8 The list of countries, chosen on the basis of the availability of data, is reported in table A1 in the Appendix.   7
The dependent variable equals total amount of investments of a country divided by GDP.  
BANKRi measures the degree of sophistication of the bankruptcy law in country i. It equals 0 if the 
country has no practice, 1 if foreclosure is the only debt enforcement proceeding available in the 
country, 2 if liquidation is also available in the country, 3 if also reorganization procedures are 
adopted in the country. 
ENFi measures the efficiency of the bankruptcy system and it is expressed as an international rank 
(lower rankings mean higher efficiency). It is a composite index taking into account proceedings 
time, actual costs and recovery rates of the bankruptcy proceedings (World Bank, Doing Business 
Report 2008). Time is recorded in calendar years and captures the estimated duration required to 
complete a bankruptcy. The cost of the bankruptcy proceedings is recorded as a percentage of the 
estate’s value
9.  The recovery rate is recorded as cents on the dollar recovered by claimants through 
the bankruptcy proceedings
10. 
RULEi measures the rule of law for country i and is taken from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) project of the World Bank. It is an index for the “integrity” of the legal 
environment. 
INTi is the interest rate of banks (lending rate, average annual percentage) for country i reported by 
the IMF International Financial Statistics; the considered variable is expressed in real terms (base 
year 2000). 
SAVi indicates Gross National Savings as percentage of GDP for country i and is extracted from the 
World Bank Development Report
11. 
FINi measures the financial market development of country i. It is given by the domestic credit 
provided by banking sector as percentage of GDP reported by the World Bank Development 
Report. 
RISKi indicates the investment risk for country i focusing attention on the investment profile sub-
components reported by PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Specifically, it 
takes into account contract viability, profits repatriation and payments delays. 
t γ  indicates time effects; 
i u  indicates countries’ effects; 
it ε  is the stochastic residuals. 
Some clarifications are required on Bankruptcy Law and its enforcement. 
With respect to Bankruptcy Law, the research does not explicitly consider the several bankruptcy 
provisions that are likely to affect the resolution of financial distress. The main goal here is not to 
evaluate if some bankruptcy procedures are better than others or in which countries they should be 
applied. The objective is to analyse if, and to what extent, the degree of sophistication of the 
bankruptcy law and its enforcement can affect total amount of investment in a country
12.  
Furthermore, to evaluate the efficiency of a bankruptcy system both the liquidation and the 
reorganization efficiency should be taken into account. Good bankruptcy laws close unviable 
business and reorganize viable ones thus regulating more efficiently the insolvency proceedings 
                                                 
9 The cost is calculated by World Bank on the basis of survey responses by practicing insolvency lawyers. If several 
respondents report different estimates, the median reported value is used (see Data Notes in World Bank Doing 
Business 2008 for details). 
10 The calculation takes into account whether the business is kept as a going concern during the proceedings, as well as 
bankruptcy costs and the loss in value due to the time spent closing down used (see Data Notes in World Bank Doing 
Business 2008 for details). 
11 When Gross National Saving is not explicitly reported on Economic Activity table of the Selected Development 
Indicators, it is calculated by subtracting Household final consumption expenditure and General Government final 
consumption expenditure to GDP. 
12 The problem of multicollinearity has been taken into account by testing the correlation between the sophistication 
degree of the Bankruptcy Law and the enforcement rank. The correlation, significant at the 1% level, equals –0.28.   8
(World Bank, Doing Business Report 2007). Nevertheless, the analysis actually considers “closing 
a business” enforcement as proxy for bankruptcy system efficiency since reorganization rates (ratio 
of the number of firms in a reorganization procedure to the total number of bankrupt firms), as well 
as success rates (ratio of the number of firms that reorganize successfully to the total number of 
bankrupt firms), are low around the world
13. As pointed out by Couwenberg (2001), the 
overwhelming majority of the insolvency proceedings around the world concerns liquidation. 
Moreover, data on reorganization and success rates are not available for all countries and/or over 
the whole considered period. 
Therefore, ENFi indicates the “closing a business” enforcement rank provided by the World Bank 
and is assumed to be a reliable indicator of the insolvency efficiency in general. Low values mean 
that a country reaches the top positions in the international ranking and rigorously enforces 
bankruptcy procedures (high efficiency)
14. 
The efficiency of a bankruptcy system can be evaluated for the three stages of the bankruptcy 
process (Couwenberg and de Jong 2008; Franks et al. 1996). The ex ante efficiency (first stage) 
aims to provide incentives for entrepreneurs to limit the usage of the legal procedures for 
bankruptcy. The interim efficiency (second stage) takes place during the financial distress, when the 
bankruptcy procedure is tainted by conflicts of interest of participants. The ex post efficiency (third 
stage) is achieved if all creditors and other parties receive the highest payouts in accordance with 
contractual rights”. Therefore, efficiency arise when bankruptcy process costs are low, recovery 
rates are high  and distribution are driven by priority rules. Since several difficulties arise in the 
study of the first and the second stages of the bankruptcy process, this study focuses attention on the 
third phase of the bankruptcy process that can be analysed by considering specific efficiency 
proxies.  
Following Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1996), the 1992-2006 period is split into sub-periods of 
span τ
15. We adopt 3-year time periods, hence we obtain 5 observations for each country
16 (1992-
1994; 1995-1997; 1998-2000; 2001-2003; 2004-2006).  




4.  Empirical Results  
 
Section 4 presents empirical evidence on the legal determinants of investment share of GDP.  
The results of equation (1) estimation over the 1990-2006 period are reported on table 2, which 
considers all countries, and table 3, which distinguishes between rich and poor countries
17. 
                                                 
13 In Italy, for example, only 2% of the insolvency proceedings concerned the “Concordato Preventivo”, which is a 
recovery procedure, while 97% of them concerned liquidation, at least before the Bankruptcy reform adopted in recent 
years (legge delega n.80/2005) (Franzoni and Marchesi 2006). 
14 Note however that, as explained by Blazy et al. (2008), World Bank data cannot serve as proxy for differences in 
courts’ selection errors (type-I/type-II) between countries. In fact, “… some economically inefficient failing firms 
(which should have been liquidated) mistakenly may be categorized as efficient and allowed to reorganize (type-I 
error). Conversely, type-II errors occur when some economically efficient but failing firms may liquidate in bankruptcy, 
either because no reorganization procedure exists or because a procedure exists but some efficient firms are mistakenly 
categorized as inefficient”. 
15 The advantage of shorter time periods is the availability of a greater number of data, but the cost is that cyclical or 
short-run effects can bias the results through serial correlation of the errors. In our analysis we assume that there is no 
τ -order serial correlation  [ ] 0 , , = −τ ε ε t i t i E . 
16 Final observations are given by the annual average values for each 3-year period. When only one year data is 
available for a specific sub-period, it is considered as the average value for the interval.    9
 
 
Table 2 Bankruptcy system and Investment Share of GDP (1992-2006), All Countries 
Dependent 
Variable:  
Pooled OLS  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
 INV/GDPit  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
           


















            






            












            



























            






































            
R-squared    0.56  0.49  0.53 0.44  0.24  0.39 
F test (a)  46.13***  87.00***  190.55*** 150.91*** 5.23***  7.44*** 
Country Effects (F 
test) 
     12.75***  16.22*** 
Time Effects (F 
test) 
0.44 0.54  10.26**  25.45***  3.27**  8.05*** 
Hausman Test      31.71***  26.49**     
Breusch-Pagan 
Test 
   340.05***  356.33***     
Observations 
 
413 413 413 413  413  413 
(a)  It refers to Wald test when random effect model is considered 
All variables are considered in log (except dummy variables), so that estimations can be considered as elasticities 
Standard errors in parenthesis 





                                                                                                                                                                  
17 The classification of the economies is based on the World Bank Development Report. More specifically, the World 
Bank classifies the economies by income per capita and by region. GNI per capita is used to determine the following 
income classifications: low-income, $875 or less in 2005; middle-income, $876 to $10,725; and high-income, $10,726 
and above. A further division at GNI per capita $3,465 is made between lower-middle-income and  upper-middle 
income economies (World Development Report, 2008).   10
Table 3 Bankruptcy system and Investment Share of GDP (1992-2006), Rich and Poor Countries  
Dependent 
Variable:  Pooled OLS  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
INV/GDPit  Rich  Poor  Rich  Poor  Rich  Poor 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 





  0.09*** 
(0.030) 
  -0.04 
(0.040) 
  0.12** 
(0.051) 
  0.08 
(0.070) 
  0.09* 
(0.045) 
 






  -0.12** 
(0.067) 
  -0.03 
(0.124) 
  -0.17 
(0.141) 
  -0.07** 
(0.039) 
  -1.31** 
(0.654) 
 
                         
Interactionit    -0.10*** 
(0.017) 
  -0.20 
(0.049) 
  -0.07** 
(0.037) 
  0.10** 
(0.065) 
  -0.14*** 
(0.050) 
  -0.26 
(0.59) 
                         
























                         









































































































                         
























                         
R-squared   0.52  0.51  0.35  0.27  0.48  0.48  0.31  0.32  0.31  0.34  0.16  0.18 












7.35***  8.00***  2.48**   
                         
Country Effects 
(F test) 








Time Effects  
(F test) 




4.92***  5.44***  0.62  5.18** 
Breusch-Pagan 
Test 








       
Hausman Test          19.05** 16.74*  5.52  7.78         
Observations  264  264  149  149 
 
264  264  149  149  264  264  149  149 
(a)  It refers to Wald test when random effect model is considered 
All variables are considered in log (except dummy variables), so that estimations can be considered as elasticities 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*, **, ***, for 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
 
 
Let us analyse the evidence on the legal determinants of Investment share of Gross Domestic 
Product. As shown in Table 2, the F test null hypothesis that all the coefficients are jointly equal to 
zero is always rejected at 1 percent level. 
The pooled cross-section specification might generate biased and inconsistent results, since it does 
not take into account unobserved heterogeneity among countries with respect to, for example, 
managerial ability, degree of risk-aversion, legal origin, institutional framework, etc. The Breusch-  11
Pagan test, in fact, indicates that pooled cross-section is not the correct specification of the model. 
The null hypothesis
18 is rejected both when all countries are considered (table 2) and when rich and 
poor countries are analysed separately (table 2), indicating that individual shocks should be taken 
into account.  
The Hausman specification test
19 is then performed to investigate the correlation between the 
unobserved individual effect and the observed explanatory variables. As reported in table 2, we 
reject the null hypothesis; therefore the correct specification of the model is fixed effect when all 
countries are considered together (table 2, reg (5)). However, legal variables are not significant. 
When we distinguish between rich and poor countries, some differences arise. The correct 
specification of the model is Fixed effects for rich countries (table 3, reg (9)). and Random Effects 
for poor countries (table 3, reg (7))
20. 
Bankruptcy Law enters positively but not significantly for rich countries, while Bankruptcy 
enforcement rank enters at 5 percent level with the expected negative sign. The higher the judicial 
efficiency (low ranking) the higher the investment share of GDP. 
In rich countries, characterized by relatively complex insolvency systems and somehow convergent 
bankruptcy reforms (Stanghellini 2007), the investment share of GDP would be influenced by 
expected enforcement of bankruptcy procedures more than the degree of sophistication of the 
Bankruptcy Law. Legal production is sufficiently high in rich countries, and overlapping laws have 
sometimes decelerated the civil justice and increased the costs of the insolvency proceedings. In 
some circumstances, the excessive degree of sophistication of the bankruptcy Law has determined 
more costs than expected advantages. 
The degree of sophistication of the Bankruptcy Law and the Bankruptcy enforcement have the 
expected sign also when poor countries’ investments are considered (table 3, reg (7)), however only 
bankruptcy law enters significantly at 5 percent level. The result could be partially explained by the 
fact that poor countries usually have very simple debt enforcement proceedings. When bankrupts 
are expected to be punished too quickly and severely, entrepreneurs may be discouraged from 
taking the financial risks needed to make their investments, as well as letting off defaulting debtors 
too readily may discourage potential creditors because of moral hazard. Therefore, at the least a 
certain degree of sophistication of the Bankruptcy Law is desirable to guarantee creditors and make 
investments possible. 
Rule of Law enters positively and significantly both for rich and poor countries. 
All other explanatory variables enter significantly with the expected sign when the analysis focuses 
attention on rich countries (table 3, reg (9)). Interest rate enters negatively and significantly at the 1 
percent level showing that high interest rate is associated with low investment levels. Gross 
National Savings and Financial Development are positively and significantly associated with total 
amount of investment as percentage of GDP. 
When poor countries are considered, Interest Rate, Gross National Savings, Investment Risk and 
Financial Development enter with the expected sign but only Financial development is significant at 
the 1 percent level (table 3, reg (7)). 
The F test on the time dummies variables allows us to reject the hypothesis that all the coefficient 
are jointly equal to zero. 
 
                                                 
18 The null hypothesis of the Breush-Pagan test is that the groupwise variance is equal to zero. Under the null, there are 
not individual shocks and OLS estimation produce unbiased results. Otherwise, fixed or random effect models have to 
be used. 
19 The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is “Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic”. Under the null, the 
correlation between the unobserved individual effects and the explanatory variables is zero. Hence, the correct 
specification of the model is Random Effect, which obtains efficient and consistent estimates.  
20  The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is rejected (Prob>chi2 = 0.03) for rich countries while it is not rejected 
(Prob>chi2 = 0.51) for poor countries.    12
4.1.1 The Interaction effect  
 
Regressions (2), (4), (6) in table 2, (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), (12) in table 3 include the Interaction term 
between Bankruptcy Law and Bankruptcy Enforcement. Bambor et al. (2006) argue that analysts 
should include each of the elements that constitute the interaction term when specifying 
multiplicative interaction models, except in some circumstances that, however, are satisfied in our 
research. The first necessary condition that must be met before omitting constitutive terms without 
obtaining significant inferential errors is that “…the analyst has a strong expectation that the 
omitted variable has no effect on the dependent variable in the absence of the other modifying 
variable” (Brambor et al. 2006, p. 68). In our analysis, we expect that bankruptcy law has no effect 
on the investment share of GDP when enforcement is zero, as well as insolvency enforcement has 
no effect on the investment share of GDP if the bankruptcy law does not exist. The second 
condition that must be met before omitting constitutive terms is that the analyst should estimate the 
fully specified model (with the interaction and all constitutive terms) and find that the coefficient of 
the omitted variable is zero. As shown in table A4 in the appendix, the coefficients of the omitted 
variables are near to zero when all constitutive terms are included in the model.       
Therefore, the model becomes: 
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t=1992, …, 2006   i=1, …, 91 countries 





















The effect of the Bankruptcy Law on the investment share of GDP depends on the procedures 
efficiency, as well as the effect of the law enforcement on investment share of GDP depends on the 
degree of sophistication of the Bankruptcy Law. One expects that the bankruptcy law has no effect 
if there is no enforcement in a country (i.e. because of corruption, a war or a revolution), as well as 
analysing the efficiency makes no sense if no Bankrupt regulation is adopted in a country. 
Previous empirical studies (Claessens and Klapper 2005) found that countries characterized by 
weak and simple bankruptcy law have answered by rigorously enforcing insolvency procedures 
(substitution effect). Our analysis partially confirms this evidence by finding contrasting results 
depending on the development level of each country.  
More specifically, the interaction term enters negatively and significantly at the 1 percent level for 
rich countries (table 3, reg(10)). When the enforcement rank decreases (higher efficiency), the 
effect of the Bankruptcy Law on the investment share of GDP increases. On the contrary, if the 
enforcement rank increases (lower efficiency), the effect of Bankruptcy Law on the investment 
share of GDP decreases. Estimation results would therefore suggest some complementary effect 
between the quality of the law and the quality of the enforcement in rich countries. This means that 
legal production does not determine the expected results if it is not well enforced. Bankruptcy 
reforms should be accompanied by enforcement improvements in rich countries, where the legal 
production is high enough. According to the World Bank “…a country that wants efficient 
bankruptcy should regulate only what it can enforce. Sophisticated reorganization procedures work   13
in rich countries, with experienced judges and lawyers and a liquid market for the assets of 
reorganizing firms” (Doing Business 2007).    
The interaction term enters positively and significantly at the 5 percent level when poor countries 
are considered (table 3, reg(8)). The effect of the Bankruptcy Law on the investment share of GDP 
decreases when the enforcement rank decreases (higher efficiency), suggesting a certain degree of 
substitution between the quality of the law and its enforcement. We find that countries characterized 
by weak bankruptcy law have reacted by rigorously enforcing insolvency procedures. 
To summarize, below a certain level of per-capita GDP a substitution effect prevails between 
Bankruptcy Law and Bankruptcy Enforcement. On the contrary, empirical evidence would suggest 




4.1.2 Dealing with endogeneity  
 
As it is known, fixed effects in panel data model allow us to solve the omitted variable problem by 
controlling for the unobservable individual effect but, because of simultaneity, the endogeneity 
problem is still present. One could think that also the investment share of GDP determines the 
degree of sophistication of the bankruptcy law and its enforcement. More specifically, the 
bankruptcy law and its efficiency, as well as the other potential endogenous explanatory variables, 
could be determined jointly with the dependent variable.  
The traditional approach to solve the endogeneity problem consists in instrumental variables 
regression with external instruments
21 and fixed or random effects estimators (depending on the 
existence of some correlation between the unobserved effect and the explanatory variables).  
Focusing attention on our variables of interest, reasonable instruments for enforcement rank and 
bankruptcy law could be adopted. 
Possible external instruments for bankruptcy enforcement include, for example, the ratio between 
total number of firms in a bankruptcy procedure and total number of firms, judges’ productivity and 
total number of courts in each country. 
With regard to the ratio between total number of firms in a bankruptcy procedure and total number 
of firms, empirical studies have shown that the higher the efficiency of the bankruptcy procedure 
the higher the number of firms that enter the bankruptcy procedure, reach an agreement on a 
reorganization plan and successfully survive (Claessens and Klapper 2005). A proxy for judges’ 
productivity could be the ratio between the total number of sentences and the total number of 
judicial proceedings (in a calendar year). The third cited instrument could be more problematic 
since many questions concern the relationship between the number of courts and judicial 
enforcement. One could think that the higher the number of courts the higher the judicial system 
efficiency. Nevertheless, some studies suggest to reduce the number of courts by increasing their 
size. Higher enforcement is reached in larger size courts because of economies of scale and judges’ 
specialization (Franzoni and Marchesi 2006). 
With respect to Bankruptcy Law, a possible instrument might be the survival rates of firms in a 
Bankruptcy procedure. Empirical evidence shows higher survival rates in reorganization based 
systems (Couwenberg 2001). Another instrumental variable for Bankruptcy Law might be the legal 
origin of the judicial system (La Porta et al. 1998). Blazy et al. (2008), in fact, show that 
Bankruptcy models may differ across countries because they come from different legal families. 
Also labour market rigidity influences investment share of GDP through Bankruptcy regulation. 
                                                 
21 In an equation with an endogenous explanatory variable, an instrumental variable is a variable that does not appear in 
the equation, is uncorrelated with the error in the equation and is (partially) correlated with the endogenous explanatory 
variable (Wooldridge 2002).   14
Blazy et al. (2008) show that the social pro debtor model performs in countries within which the 
legal protection of workers are the more severe. The legal protection of workers may serve to 
understand why some bankruptcy models promote continuation of firms’ operations, or allow for 
deviations from absolute priority rule in favour of workers. 
Nevertheless, several problems arise when we try to follow the standard approach with external 
instrumental variables since data are not available for all considered countries and/or over the whole 
analysed period. 
An alternative approach to tackle the endogeneity issue uses internal instruments by exploiting 
panel data structure. More specifically, we use a Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimator 
(Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998) treating all explanatory variables as potentially 
endogenous. Thus, we rewrite eq.(1) in dynamics terms, as follows: 
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Eq.(3) is a dynamic panel model with fixed effects and a lagged dependent variable which allows us 
to take into account the dynamic nature of the investments
22. It can be properly estimated through 
the first differences GMM (GMM-DIFF) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) which 
uses all the available lags of each independent variable in levels as instruments. However, the levels 
are poor instruments when variables exhibit strong persistence, as in the analysed model (weak 
instruments). For this reason, we employ the estimation of the system of equations (GMM-SYS) 
implemented by Blundell and Bond (1998). It combines the first differenced regression used in 
GMM-DIFF and the eq.(3) in levels, whose instruments are the lagged differences of the 
endogenous variables
23.  
The choice of the endogenous variables and the lags has been performed through the Difference-in-
Sargan test. The endogenous variable is Financial Development for which the t-2 and t-3 lags have 
been used, while t-3 lag has been used for the lagged investment share of GDP. Table 4 shows the 
empirical results. The Null hypothesis of the Hansen test is not rejected for all estimations, therefore 
the instruments satisfy the orthogonality condition required for their appropriateness. Moreover, we 
report the results of the tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to detect first and second-order 
serial correlation in the residuals. If  it ε  are not serially correlated, the differenced residuals should 
show autocorrelation of first-order and absence of second-order serial correlation. As shown in table 
4, the absence of second-order serial correlation, which is a necessary condition for the validity of 
the instruments, is satisfied in our analysis.  
The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is significant with a positive sign both for rich and 
poor countries showing the opportunity of the dynamic specification of the model. With respect to 
the other explanatory variables, the GMM-System confirms our previous estimation results. The 
degree of sophistication of the Bankrupt Law enters positively both for poor and rich countries, but 
it is not significant for the last ones. The enforcement rank enters negatively, therefore low enforce 
rank (high efficiency) is associated with high investment share of GDP, but it is significant at the 1 
percent level only for rich countries. Rule of Law enters positively and significantly both for rich 
and poor countries. 
All other explanatory variables enter with the expected sign but the interest rate is not significant for 
poor countries while financial development is not significant for rich countries. 
                                                 
22 Note that the introduction of the lagged dependent variable implies that both the OLS and Fixed Effects estimates are 
biased because of the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. 
23 For details, see Roodman (2006).   15
 
Table 4 Empirical results of the dynamic panel data model: GMM-System 
Dependent Variable: 
INV/GDPit  All  Rich  Poor 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       






       















       






       






       






       






       






       






       
Time Effects  
(F test) 
11.73**  11.36**  11.78** 
Hansen test (p-value)  0.48  0.27  0.10 
AR (1)   -3.50***  -4.65***  -2.25*** 
AR (2)   0.52  0.58  -0.36 
Observations  338  216  122 
       
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 





The aim of the paper is to examine whether and to what extent cross-country differences in the 
Bankruptcy law and its efficiency explain cross-country differences in the level of investment share 
of GDP. Answering this question has important policy implications, given the current legislative 
and regulatory responses to lending practices and bankruptcy protection. 
Empirical evidence suggests that both the sophistication degree of the Bankruptcy Law and the 
efficiency of the insolvency proceedings are positively associated with the investment share of  
gross domestic product.  
In rich countries, however, the degree of sophistication of the Bankruptcy Law is not significant. 
The investment share of GDP would be influenced by the expected enforcement of bankruptcy 
procedures more than the Bankruptcy Law. Legal production is sufficiently high and overlapping 
laws have often decelerated the civil justice and increased the costs of the insolvency proceedings.    16
When poor countries’ investments are considered, bankruptcy law enters significantly with the 
expected positive sign. The result could be partially explained by the fact that poor countries usually 
have very simple debt enforcement proceedings. These very simple proceedings are usually well 
enforced, but they do not distinguish among different insolvency situations. When bankrupts are 
expected to be punished too quickly and severely, entrepreneurs may be discouraged from taking 
the financial risks needed to make their investments, as well as letting off defaulting debtors too 
readily may discourage potential creditors because of moral hazard.  Therefore, a certain degree of 
sophistication of the Bankruptcy Law is desirable to guarantee creditors and make investments 
possible. 
Furthermore, estimation results would suggest some complementary effect between the quality of 
the law and the quality of the enforcement in rich countries. Legal production does not determine 
the expected results if it is not well enforced, hence reforms aimed at improving application of law 
would be more desirable than reforms that increase legal production with the frequent result of 
decelerating the judicial system. On the contrary, the interaction term indicates some substitution 
effect in poor countries, suggesting that countries characterized by weak bankruptcy law have 
answered by rigorously enforcing insolvency procedures. 
The paper suggests interesting directions for future research. The analysis covers the 1992-2006 
period. In the following years, several reforms of the bankruptcy procedures have been adopted 
around the world. It would be motivating to evaluate the effects of these reforms in order to 
investigate if there is a process of convergence among different bankruptcy systems. It would also 
be appealing to find out if, and to what extent, the obtained results vary if we distinguish among 
different sectors. Furthermore, because of the current international financial crisis, many households 
and firms are likely to go under. For a given degree of sophistication of the Bankruptcy Law, it 
would be interesting to compare and evaluate different governments’ plans applied to solve or avoid 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1  Selected Countries 
Algeria  Estonia  Macedonia, FYR  Sierra Leone 
Angola Finland Malawi Singapore 
Argentina France  Malaysia  Slovakia 
Armenia Georgia  Mexico  Slovenia 
Australia Germany Moldova South  Africa 
Austria Greece Morocco  Spain 
Belarus Guatemala  Mozambique  Sri  Lanka 
Belgium Honduras  Namibia Sweden 
Botswana Hong  Kong,  China  Netherlands  Switzerland 
Brazil Hungary  New  Zealand  Syria 
Bulgaria Indonesia  Nicaragua  Tanzania 
Canada Ireland Nigeria Thailand 
Chile Israel Norway  Togo 
China Italy  Oman Ukraine 
Colombia Jamaica  Panama  United  Kingdom 
Costa Rica  Japan  Papua New Guinea  United States 
Croatia Jordan  Paraguay  Uruguay 
Czech Republic  Kazakhstan  Peru  Venezuela 
Denmark Korea  Philippines  Vietnam 
Dominican Republic  Kuwait  Poland  Yemen 
Ecuador Latvia  Portugal Zambia 
Egypt Lebanon  Romania  Zimbabwe 
El Salvador  Lithuania  Russia   
 
Table A2 Data and Sources 
 Sources 
Investment Share of real 
GDP 
Penn World Table 6.2 
International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
Bankruptcy Law 
World Bank, Doing Business Report (several issues) 
Djankov, S., Hart, O., McLiesh, C., Shleifer, A. (2007). Debt 
Enforcement Around the World. ECGI Finance Working Paper no. 147. 
Couwenberg, O. (2001). Survival rates in bankruptcy systems: 
Overlooking the evidence. European Journal of Law and Economics, 
12, 253-273. 
Closing a Business:  
Enforcement Rank  World Bank, Doing Business Report (several issues) 
Rule of Law  The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (several issues) 
World Bank: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2008/ 
Interest rate  
(lending rate) 
International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
OECD Economic Outlook No 81: Annual and Quarterly data 
Gross National Savings  World Bank, World Development Report (Selected Indicators) (several 
issues) 




International Country Risk Guide 
(PRS Group) 
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Table A3 Summary Statistics 




Deviation  r σ  
Min Max 
Investment/GDP 15.94  7.74  0.48  2.01  42.53 
Interest Rate (Lending)  23.81  25.70  1.07  1.81  207 
Gross National Savings  18.46  12.24  0.66  -29  53 
Rule of Law  55.46  28.57  0.51  2.4  100 
Investment Risk  9.42  2.29  0.24  0.7  12.5 
Financial Market 
Development 
64.60 52.25  0.80  -78 312.5 
Bankruptcy 
Enforcement (ranking) 
67.27 44.96  0.66  1  151 
time 2.87  1.58  0.55  0.4  10 
cost 13.89  9.49  0.68  1  42 
recovery rate  40.55  25.90  0.63  0  94 
Bankruptcy Law  1.81  1.06  0.58  0  3 
Dummy Poor/Rich 
Countries 
0.60 0.48  0.8  0  1 
 
 





  Random 
Effects 
 
  Fixed Effects    
INV/GDP  Rich  Poor  Rich  Poor  Rich  Poor 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Bankruptcy Law  -0.001  0.0004  -0.008  -0.005  -0.001  0.06 
  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003) 




-0.003**  -0.002  -0.005*  -0.005*  -0.008  -0.002** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.0012) 
             
Interaction  -0.00  0.00  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.01 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.09)  (0.006) 
             
Interest rate   -0.06*  0.15**  -0.20***  -0.002  -0.22***  -0.06 
  (0.035)  (0.058)  (0.031)  (0.060)  (0.034)  (0.067) 
             
Gross National 
Savings 
0.15***  0.09**  0.09**  0.005  0.10**  -0.01 
  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
             
Rule of Law   0.11*  0.15**  0.13*  0.11*  0.25***  0.06 
  (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.072)  (0.060)  (0.094)  (0.070) 
             
Investment Risk   -0.44***  -0.14**  -0.33**  -0.29*  0.69  -0.46 
  (0.116)  (0.071)  (0.175)  (0.155)  (0.433)  (0.377) 
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Financial 
Development 
0.20***  0.18***  0.11***  0.14***  0.09**  0.11** 
  (0.041)  (0.057)  (0.037)  (0.046)  (0.044)  (0.056) 
             
             
Constant  2.5***  0.78  3.21***  2.43***  0.57  4.16 
  (0.346)  (0.522)  (0.534)  (0.68)  (1.29)  (1.24) 
             
R-squared   0.52  0.35  0.49  0.29  0.32  0.20 
F test   53.24***  9.15***  131.34***  36.63***  6.87***   
             
Country Effects 
(F test) 
        13.38***  10.19*** 
Time Effects (F 
test) 
    19.01***  1.43  5.04***  0.92 
Breusch-Pagan 
Test 
    231.79***  115.62***     
Hausman Test      22.02**  10.90     
Observations  264  149  264  149  263  149 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
*, **, ***, for 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
 
 
 